ABSTRACT Fog computing-enhanced Internet of Things (IoT) has recently received considerable attention, as the fog devices deployed at the network edge can not only provide low latency, location awareness but also improve real-time and quality of services in IoT application scenarios. Privacy-preserving data aggregation is one of typical fog computing applications in IoT, and many privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes have been proposed in the past years. However, most of them only support data aggregation for homogeneous IoT devices, and cannot aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data into one in some real IoT applications. To address this challenge, in this paper, we present a lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, called Lightweight Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation, for fog computing-enhanced IoT. The proposed LPDA is characterized by employing the homomorphic Paillier encryption, Chinese Remainder Theorem, and one-way hash chain techniques to not only aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data into one, but also early filter injected false data at the network edge. Detailed security analysis shows LPDA is really secure and privacy-enhanced with differential privacy techniques. In addition, extensive performance evaluations are conducted, and the results indicate LPDA is really lightweight in fog computing-enhanced IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancement and wide deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) have revolutionized our lifestyle greatly by providing the most convenience and flexibility in our various daily applications. The typical applications of IoT include smart grid [1] , smart healthcare [2] , smart home [3] , smart city [4] , and even smart nation [5] . Although these IoT applications have their unique characteristics in their respective fields, their essences are the same, i.e., any IoT application is an interconnected network formed by a number of IoT devices, which can not only collect nearly real-time data but also exchange them in time for achieving better and intelligent decisions. For example, in smart grid application, smart meters are deployed at all homes in a residential area, each smart meter can collect user's electricity use data, and periodically (e.g., every 15 minutes [6] ) report to the control center, and the control center can base the reported data to make real-time data analytics and take the corresponding actions to guarantee the health of power system.
Clearly, IoT will be of great benefit to our daily lives. However, in order to fully take advantage of IoT, we have to address some challenges lying ahead in IoT [7] . Many IoT applications generate huge volumes of data for real-time analytics, as a result, IoT is a big data problem [8] .
In order to manage and analyze huge volumes of data and derive potential values from IoT, we need to consider more suitable real-time big data mining and machine learning techniques for IoT insights. At the same time, IoT is not just about big data analytics, but also about the connected IoT devices and the data transmission from IoT devices to the control center.
The more the real-time data report from IoT devices, the better the decision can be made from IoT. However, in order to fit the real-time data report, it will cost huge communication resources. Even worse, when false data are injected in IoT [9] , it not only wastes the scarce communication bandwidth, but also causes inaccurate decisions made at the control center. Therefore, desirable mechanisms are expected to address the challenges, i.e., to reduce the communication costs and early filter the false injected data during the IoT data report.
FIGURE 1.
Fog computing paradigm extends the cloud computing capabilities to the network edge to provide i) real time response with local process, and ii) bandwidth saving with pre-process (e.g., aggregation).
The concept of fog computing was proposed by Cisco in 2012 [10] , which aims to solve problems or pre-process parts of a problem by keeping data at the network edge with local fog devices (e.g., Cisco next generation routers), rather than routing everything through a central control center. Because of its network edge computing feature, fog computing can not only provide low latency, location awareness but also improve real-time and quality of services in network-based applications [11] - [13] . Since the objective of fog computing is not to replace the powerful cloud computing, but to extend the computing capabilities to the network edge, as shown in Fig. 1 , the IoT challenges (bandwidth and security) mentioned-above can be resolved by fog computing paradigm. For example, we can deploy a fog device (as a gateway) at the network edge, which is in charge of collecting all IoT devices' data, aggregating and forwarding them to the central control center, so as to save the bandwidth. In addition, in case there exist injected false data by external attackers, the fog device can also execute source authentication to early filter injected false data at the network edge. Although the above fog computing-enhanced IoT is promising, the trust issue of fog device cannot be ignored. Since it is deployed at the network edge, the fog device cannot be fully trusted. Therefore, in some IoT applications, e.g., smart grid, in order to protect each individual IoT device's data, the fog device cannot see each individual data when running the aggregation. As a result, the privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes are desirable in IoT applications.
Soothly, when the buzz word ''fog computing'' becomes popular recently, several privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes have been proposed [1] , [6] , [14] - [27] , and they can be well fit in fog computing-enhanced IoT. However, most of them only support one type of aggregation (e.g, sum or mean) for homogenous IoT devices. In case there are hybrid IoT devices in some real IoT applications, those schemes cannot aggregate all data into one. Therefore, there is a high desire to design a privacy-preserving data aggregation for hybrid IoT devices.
In this paper, in order to address the above challenge, we propose a new lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, called Lightweight Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation (LPDA), for fog computing-enhanced IoT. The proposed LPDA is characterized by employing the Chinese Remainder Theorem to aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data into one, and use the one-way hash chain to run the source authentication at the network edge to early filter the injected false data. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are threefold as follows.
• First, we propose our LPDA aggregation scheme for fog computing-enhanced IoT, which combines the homomorphic Paillier encryption [28] , Chinese Remainder Theorem, and one-way hash chain techniques to enable a fog device at the network edge to not only aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data into one for saving scarce bandwidth, but also early filter injected false data for security enhancement.
• Secondly, we give the detailed analysis to show that our proposed LPDA is really secure under our defined security model. Particularly, we also use the differential privacy techniques [29] to enhance the privacy-preservation of LPDA, i.e., LPDA can also resist differential attacks.
• Thirdly, we not only theoretically analyze the communication overheads of LPDA but also run extensive experiments to evaluate the computational costs of LPDA, and the results indicate LPDA is really lightweight and suits in fog computing-enhanced IoT. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce our system model, security model and design goal. Then, we describe some preliminaries in Section III. In Section IV, we present our LPDA scheme, followed by security analysis and performance evaluation in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Related work is discussed in Section VII. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section VIII.
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we formalize our system model, security model, and identify our design goal.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
In our system model, we consider a hybrid IoTs network, which includes a set of heterogeneous IoT devices
fog device deployed at the network edge, a control center, and a trusted authority, as shown in Fig. 2 . capabilities, which enables D i to periodically report its sensing result x i to the control center via the fog device. Due to the nature of heterogeneity, we can further divide IoT devices D into to several subsets according to their sensing functions, i.e., all IoT devices with the same sensing functions will be placed in the same subset.
Without loss of generality, we assume D can be divided into k subsets:
Note that, since IoT devices are usually not powerful, we cannot deploy time-consuming security algorithms, and thus lightweight security mechanisms are desirable to mount on these IoT devices.
• Fog device: In hybrid IoTs, the fog devices is a critical component for fog computing, which is deployed at network edge and serves as the relay between the IoT devices and the control center. In particular, the fog device will accomplish some fog computing functions, e.g., aggregate all IoT devices' data (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x N ) and forward them to the control center, and also help the control center to locally filter some injected data from external attackers.
• Control center: The control center receives all IoT devices' data (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x N ) via the fog device, and makes some data analytics according to some application requirements. Since all data come from heterogenous IoT devices, it is not accurate to directly operate on all data. Therefore, for each subset D j ⊂ D, the control center will compute its mean E(D j ) and variance Var(D j ) in this work, where
• Trusted authority: In our system model, the trusted authority is a trusted third party, whose duty is to bootstrap the system, manage key materials and assign keys to all IoT devices, the fog device, and the control center.
Note that, after bootstrapping the system, the trusted authority will be offline, i.e., it will not participate in the subsequent actions.
B. SECURITY MODEL
In our security model, we consider the trusted authority is fully trusted, while the control center and fog device are honest-but-curious, because they may be affected by undetected malwares, and the malwares will eavesdrop IoT devices' data. Although the control center and fog device are honest-but-curious, i.e., they follow the protocols, but are also curious about IoT devices' data privacy, they will not collude with each other in this work. Because IoT devices are usually not powerful, the security of IoT devices is always challenging. Since this work is focused on the privacy-preserving aggregation, we will not discuss the inside threats, that is, the IoT devices are not compromised in this work. Nevertheless, we still consider some IoT devices could be malfunctioning and stop reporting for some periods, and it is also possible for some external attackers to launch false data injection attack. Therefore, the fog device at the network edge is expected to filter these false data locally, and will not send them to the control center.
Note that, the external attackers may launch other active attacks, i.e., Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, to the hybrid IoT networks. Again, since the privacy-preserving aggregation is our focus, those active attacks are beyond the scope of this work, and will be discussed in future.
C. DESIGN GOAL
Under the aforementioned system model and security model, our design goal is to propose a lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for hybrid IoT networks. In particular, the following four objectives should be achieved:
• Privacy: The proposed aggregation scheme should be privacy-preserving, that is, the control center can compute each subset D j 's mean and variance, and cannot obtain each individual IoT device's data.
• Security: The proposed aggregation scheme can resist against the false data injection attack from external attackers, that is, the fog device can filter false data locally at the network edge.
• Fault-Tolerance: The proposed aggregation scheme should be falut-tolerant, that is, even though some IoT devices are malfunctioning and stop reporting to the control center, the control center can still compute the mean and variance of the reported data in each subset.
• Efficiency: The proposed aggregation scheme should be efficient, that is, the computational costs at IoT devices, fog device, and control center should be as less as possible, and the communication overheads should also be minimal.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review the Chinese Remainder Theorem, one-way hash chain, and some properties under the modulo n 2 , which will serve as the building blocks of the proposed LPDA scheme.
A. CHINESE REMAINDER THEOREM
The Chinese Remainder Theorem says that we can uniquely solve any pair of congruences that have relatively prime moduli, which enables us to devise an efficient data aggregation scheme for fog computing-enhanced IoT with hybrid IoT devices and is described as follows.
Theorem 1 (Chinese Remainder Theorem):
Suppose that q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q k are pairwise relatively prime positive integers, and let a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a k be integers. Then, the system of congruences,
B. ONE-WAY HASH CHAIN
One-Way Hash Chain is a very popular security technique, which has been widely discussed in data stream authentication, e.g., TESLA [30] . In this work, we will apply it to achieve lightweight authentication in hybrid IoTs.
Given a secure hash function h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l , a oneway hash chain is defined as a set of values {k 0 , k 1 , · · · , k n } for n ∈ Z such that k n ∈ {0, 1} l is a randomly chosen value, and k i = h(k i+1 ) for i = 0 to n − 1.
Due to the one-wayness, given k i in a hash chain, it is easy to compute k j , where j < i; however, it is computationally infeasible to compute k l , where l > i.
C. SOME PROPERTIES UNDER THE MODULO n 2
Let p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 be two safe primes, where p and q are also two primes. Compute n = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q−1) = 2p q , the least common multiple of p−1 and q−1. Then, we have the following properties under the modulo n 2 .
1) For any
The first property has been applied in designing the popular Pailler Homomorphic Encryption, the detailed proof can be found in [28] . The second property can be easily proved with mathematical induction. When m = 1, the left side becomes 1 + n · x i , which is equal to the right side. Assume, when m = k, we have
which equals the right side and shows that the second property is also correct. In particular, when m = λ and all x i = x, we will have
IV. PROPOSED LPDA SCHEME
In this section, we present our lightweight privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme (LDPA) for hybrid IoTs, which mainly consists of the following four parts: system initialization, IoT device report generation, fog device report aggregation, and control center report reading and analytics.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
As the trusted authority (TA) is a fully trusted entity in the system, it is reasonable to assume the TA bootstraps the whole system. Specifically, given the security parameters k 0 , k 1 , l, TA first randomly chooses two safe prime numbers p, q, where p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, and |p| = |q| = k 0 , compute n = pq, and
Consider there are k subsets D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , · · · , D k in the network, and the IoT device's sensing data range of each subset
Note that, the range [0, X ] is still a small message space in comparison with Z n . With these knowledge, the TA chooses k + 1 prime numbers α 0 , q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q k , and computes
where each prime q i is of the same length, i.e., |q i | = k 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The conditions of the above parameters follow
which enable us to aggregate all data into one ciphertext. Next, the TA chooses two secure cryptographic hash functions h, H , where h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l and VOLUME 5, 2017 H : {0, 1} * → Z * n , and another random number t 0 ∈ {0, 1} l as a secret key. As the IoT devices will periodically report their data to the control center. we divide the report time period into w time slots, as shown in Fig. 4 , and at every time slot, each IoT device will report its sensing data. To cater for this setting, the TA chooses a random number t 0 and builds N one-way hash chains
where h iw ∈ {0, 1} l is a randomly chosen number, and
In addition, for each h ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ w, the TA also computes its corresponding key
where h ij will be used for one-time authentication in time slot T j and k ij will be used for encryption in time slot T j . The TA also makes a signature σ on all hash chains' heads (h 10 , h 20 , · · · , h N 0 ) so as to ensure all hash chains are indeed valid for authentication. Finally, the TA also chooses AES as the encryption algorithm in the system and sets params = {n,
, AES} as the system public parameters. After the above parameter settings, the TA will assign the key materials to all entities. Specifically,
• For each IoT device D i ∈ D, the TA will assign the secret key s i , the secret hash chain
, and the public parameters params to D i via a secure channel.
• For the fog device, the TA will first choose a random number sk as the shared key between the fog device and the control center, and assign the shared key sk, the signed hash chain heads (h 10 , h 20 , · · · , h N 0 ) and σ , together with the secret keys (s N +1 , t 0 ) and the public parameters params to the fog device.
• For the control center, the TA will assign the same shared key sk and the secret keys (s 0 , λ), together with the public parameters params to the control center.
B. IoT DEVICE REPORT GENERATION
At every time slot T s , each IoT device D i will report its sensing data x i by running the following steps:
• 
and uses the key k is to compute C is = AES k is (c is ), which can avoid the control center directly obtain c is to get D i 's individual data.
• Step 2: D i uses the hash value h is in its hash chain HC i to compute
• Step 3: D i forwards (C is , h is , mac is ) to the fog device. Note that, the IoT device D i can very efficiently run the above steps. In particular, when H (T s ) n·s i is pre-computed in advance, then only fast multiplication operations and AES encryption are required.
C. FOG DEVICE REPORT AGGREGATION
After receiving (C is , h is , mac is ) in time slot T s , the fog device runs the following steps to check its validity.
• = mac is . If it does hold, C is will be accepted, otherwise C is will be filtered out.
• Step 3: Once C is is accepted, the fog device computes k is = h(h is ||t 0 ) and uses k is to recover c is from C is = AES k is (c is ). After receiving all (c 1s , c 2s , · · · , c Ns ) from all IoT devices D in time slot T s , the fog device uses the secret key s N +1 to compute H (T s ) n·s N +1 and runs the following data aggregation operations
and forwards (C s , mac s ) to the control center.
D. CONTROL CENTER REPORT READING AND ANALYTICS
Upon receiving (C s , mac s ) in time slot T s , the control center first verifies C s by checking mac s = h(C s ||T s ||sk). If C s is valid, the control center runs the following steps for report reading and analytics.
• Step 1: The control center uses the secret key s 0 to compute H (T s ) n·s 0 . Note that, H (T s ) n·s 0 can also be pre-computed, and then the report reading can be accelerated.
•
Step 2: The control center computes
i=0 s i =κ·λ for some integer κ 
• Step 3: Because we set the conditions x i < X and N · (X 2 + X · α 0 ) < q i , we will have (12) and then from
Therefore, in step 3, the control center computes
and
• Step 4: From the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the condition N · X 2 ≤ α 0 , for each subset D j ∈ D, the control center can compute its mean and variance as follows
FAULT TOLERANCE
In case that one IoT device D a in subset D b is malfunctioning, D a stops reporting to the control center. Then, after aggregating other devices' data into C s , the fog device reports ''D a is malfunctioning'' to the control center, together with C * s , which does not include D a 's data. Because the condition N +1 i=0 H (T s ) n·s i ≡ 1 mod n 2 does not hold, the control center uses the secret key λ to run the following steps:
The control center computes
and obtains M by computing 
Therefore, even though some IoT devices are malfunctioning, the proposed LPDA scheme is still workable, i.e., the control center can still make data analytics from the rest normal IoT devices. As a result, the proposed LPDA scheme achieves fault-tolerant.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss security properties of the proposed LPDA scheme. In particular, following our design goal, we will focus on analyzing how the proposed LPDA scheme is secure against the false data injection attack from external attacks, and achieve the privacy-preserving data aggregation.
• If h is is not fresh in time slot T s , it may be a false data injection attack launched by an external attacker by replaying h is , and the fog device can identify it and will reject the false data. Therefore, the proposed LPDA scheme can resist against the false data injection from the external attacks.
• The proposed LPDA scheme is privacy preserving. In the proposed LDPA scheme, for each individual ciphertext c is =
as a message M , and the item N +1
i=1 H (T s ) n·s i as a random number R, then both c is = (1+n·m i )·r n i mod n 2 and C s = (1+n·M )·R n mod n 2 are valid Paillier ciphertexts. Because Pailler encryption is IND-CPA (indistinguishable under the chosen plaintext attack) secure, an external attacker cannot read m i and M . For the fog device, it may be curious about m i and M . However, similar as the external attacker, without knowing the secret keys s 0 and λ, it has no idea to recover them. For the control center, it has the ability to recover M , and it may be curious about each individual m i . Because c is = (1 + n · m i ) · r n i mod n 2 is encrypted with C is = AES k is (c is ), only if there is a collusion between the fog device and the control center, the control center can recover m i . However, under our defined security model, the control center cannot collude with the fog device and subsequently cannot recover m i . From the above analysis, our proposed LPDA scheme can achieve privacy-preserving in our defined security model.
ENHANCED PRIVACY WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY TECHNIQUE
The above analysis shows that the proposed LPDA can achieve privacy-preserving when there is no malfunctioning . In order to avoid this kind of privacy disclosure, we can use differential privacy technique to enhance privacy.
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY TECHNIQUE
Since the seminal work was introduced in 2006 [29] , differential privacy techniques has received considerable attention in privacy-preserving data statistics. The core idea of differential privacy technique is to add some reasonable noises, e.g., noises extracted from symmetrical geometric distribution, Laplace distribution, etc., to make the outputs from similar inputs indistinguishable. Formally, we call a randomized algorithm A(.) can achieve ε-differential privacy, if for any two data sets DS 1 and DS 2 differing on a single element, for every subset S ⊆ OutputRange(A), Pr[A(DS 1 ) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) · Pr[A(DS 2 ) ∈ S] holds. As the aggregated data are discrete in the proposed LPDA scheme, we consider noises extracted from geometric distribution. The noises generation from geometric distribution was introduced by Ghosh et al. [31] , where the noise is chosen from a symmetric geometric distribution Geom(α) with 0 < α < 1. Then, the Geom(α) can be viewed as a discrete approximation of Laplace distribution Lap(λ), where α ≈ exp(− 1 λ ). The probability density function (PDF) of geometric distribution Geom(α) is
When the sensitivity of the algorithm A(DS) is A = max DS 1 ,DS 2 ||A(DS 1 )−A(DS 2 )|| 1 for all the data sets DS 1 and DS 2 differing in at most one element, then by adding geometric noise r randomly chosen from Geom(exp(− ε A )) to the original aggregated data, the perturbed results can achieve ε-differential privacy, i.e., for any integer k ∈ OutputRange(A),
Assume that each subset D j has at most one malfunctioning device at each time slot. In order to avoid the differential attack from the control center, no matter there is a malfunctioning IoT device in D j , the fog device will run the following steps:
• Step 1: Let C be the ciphertext set received from all normal IoT devices in time slot T s . Due to the existence of some malfunctioning devices, the size of C 
Therefore, we can set A 1 = X and A 2 = X 2 . In this step, the fog device chooses the random noises x j1 from Geom(exp(− ε A 1 )) and x j2 from Geom(exp(− ε A 2 )) to implicitly add them to A 1 (D j ) and A 2 (D j ) by computing
i=0 H (T s ) n·s i ≡ 1 mod n 2 does not hold, the control center can only use the similar methods in Eqs. (20) and (16)- (18) to obtain E(D j ) and Var(D j ), where
With the above differential privacy technique, we can show both D i ∈D j x i + x j1 and D i ∈D j x 2 i + x j2 can achieve ε-differential privacy. For example, for D i ∈D j x i +x j1 aggregation, assume the control center obtains two perturbed aggregation u + x (27) Because −|u−v| ≤ |k −u|−|k −v| ≤ |u−v| and 0 < α < 1,
Therefore, D i ∈D j x i + x j1 achieves ε-differential privacy. Similarly, we can also prove
i + x j2 achieves ε-differential privacy. From the above analysis, we can conclude that the differential attack from the control center can be avoided, and the privacy is enhanced in the proposed LPDA scheme.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed LPDA scheme in terms of the communication overhead and computational costs at the IoT devices, the fog device, and the control center.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The proposed LPDA scheme achieves the privacy-preserving aggregation for hybrid IoT, i.e., it can aggregate different subsets of IoT devices' data into one, and the control center can recover each subset's mean and variance. In order to show the efficiency of LPDA, we compare LPDA with the aggregation with the basic Paillier encryption (AggBPE), i..e, the ciphertext is in the form of c = g m r n mod n 2 , under the same parameter settings, i.e., the bit length of n 2 is 
However, if we use the AggBPE to aggregate IoT devices' data, D i will encrypt x i and x 2 i into two ciphertexts. Then the communication costs become double, and the total communication overhead is 4096 × N bits. For the communication overhead from the fog device to the control center, both of them are independent from the the number of IoT devices, because data have already been aggregated at the fog device. However, the communication cost of AggBPE is dependent on the number of subsets in D. Assume there are k subsets in D, then the communication overhead is 4096×k bits. While in our LPDA scheme, as all data in all subsets have been aggregated into one ciphertext, the communication overhead from the fog device to the control center is only 2048 bits. Fig. 5 plots the communication overheads from the IoT devices to the fog device and the overhead from the fog device to the control center. From the figures, it clearly indicates our proposed LPDA is much more efficient than AggBPE. Note that, different from AggBPE, the proposed LPDA uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to aggregate all data into one, which requires us to carefully choose the proper parameters. Luckily, because the message space is small in many real application scenarios, it is not difficult for us VOLUME 5, 2017 to choose the proper parameters meeting the conditions in Eqs. (4) + X · α 0 ) < q i is also satisfied. From the condition k 1 · (k + 1) + lg k < |n|, we can choose the maximal k = 19, which means the proposed LPDA can achieve at most 19 subsets' aggregation with the above parameter settings.
B. COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
In terms of computational costs, the proposed LPDA is lightweight, because if we only take the time-consuming module exponent operations into consideration in LPDA, there are at most 1 module exponent at each IoT device, the fog device, and the control center. When we further consider the module exponent operations can be pre-computed, LPDA will become more efficient. In this subsection, we check the computational costs of LPDA by implementing it with Java (JDK 1.8) and run our experiments on a Laptop with Intel i5-6300H 2.3 GHz processor, 12GB RAM, and Window 10 platform. The detailed parameter settings are shown in Table 1 . We run our experiments 1000 times, and the average running time values are recorded in Table 2 . From the table, we can see our proposed LPDA is really efficient in terms of computational costs. Even when LPDA is privacy-enhanced with differential privacy techniques, it is still much efficient.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review some privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes [1] , [6] , [14] - [27] , which are also fit for fog computing-enhanced IoT and closely related to our proposed LPDA.
In 2011, Shi et al. [14] proposed an efficient privacypreserving data aggregation scheme for time-series data. In their scheme, the secret keys (s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n ) of all participants and the secret key s 0 of the aggregator satisfy the condition n i=0 s i = 0 mod p, and each ciphertext c i is in the form of c i = g x i H (t) s i . Then, only when all ciphertexts are aggregated, the aggregator can use H (t) s 0 to make H (t) n i=0 s i = 1, and the aggregated result n i=1 x i can be recovered. However, in case there is a malfunctioning participant, the aggregated result cannot be correctly recovered, i.e., their scheme is not fault-tolerant. In the same year, Ruj et al. [15] used the original homomorphic Paillier encryption [28] , i.e., the ciphertext is in the form of c = g m r n mod n 2 , to design a privacypreserving aggregation scheme for smart grid. Without the restriction n i=0 s i = 0 mod p, their scheme is fault-tolerant, but each individual ciphertext could be directly recovered by the control center. In 2012, Alharbi and Lin [16] used the additive homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Castelluccia et al. [32] to present a privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for smart grid, their scheme is lighweight, but the fault tolerance is not considered. Aiming at solving the fault tolerance issue, Chan et al. [17] presented novel mechanisms to enhance Shi et al.'s scheme [14] . With the new mechanisms, the enhanced scheme is resilient to user failure and compromise, and can efficiently support dynamic joins and leaves. In order to support privacypreserving multidimensional data aggregation, Lu et al. [6] presented EPPA by combining the Paillier encryption and the superincreasing sequence techniques, which can further reduce the communication overhead. Based on Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) homomorphic encryption [33] , Chen et al. [18] presented multifunctional data aggregation in privacy-preserving smart grid communications, which can support average, variance, and one-way ANOVA aggregation. Li et al. [19] also used the lattice cryptographic technique [34] to present a privacy-preserving dual-functional aggregation scheme for smart grid, which can support mean and variance aggregation at the same time. Later, by taking the requirements of fault tolerance, data integrity, and differential privacy into consideration, other novel privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes have been proposed [1] , [20] - [27] . Although the above schemes are promising and can be fit for fog computing-enhanced IoT. However, for hybrid IoT, they cannot aggregate all IoT devices' data into one ciphertext.
Different from the above schemes, our proposed LPDA scheme uses the modified Paillier encryption, i.e., the ciphertext is in the form of c = (1 + n · m)r n mod n 2 , the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the one-way hash chain, and the differential privacy techniques, to enable the fog device to aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data into one ciphertext and early filter the injected false data at the network edge. In addition, fault tolerance and efficiency can also be well achieved. Note that, EPPA [6] may be applied for hybrid IoT data aggregation, but the multiple time-consuming exponential computations make it not as efficient as the proposed LPDA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight privacypreserving data aggregation scheme, called LPDA, for fog computing-enhanced IoT. With the fog device deployed at the network edge, LPDA can not only early filter false data injected by external attackers, but also support fault-tolerance and efficiently aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data into one. Detailed security analyses, especially the enhanced differential privacy analyses, show the proposed LPDA scheme is secure under our defined security model. In addition, extensive performance analyses and experiments are conducted, and the results indicate it is really lightweight in both communication overheads and computational costs. In future work, we will evaluate our proposed scheme in some realistic IoT scenarios, consider stronger adversarial model, and design new solutions under new model. In addition, he is the Author of nine books in English and Persian on topics, including cryptography, network security, and mobile communication and over 70 journals and conference papers concerning various aspects of computer security. His current research focuses on cyber security, big security data analysis, Internet traffic analysis, and the detection of malware and attacks. He received three gold medals and 12 silver and bronze medals in international competitions around the world. 
